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ALC COURSE NARRATIVE 
Reframing Theories of Peace and State-building in Africa 
OUTLINE 
The course aims to familiarise ALC Fellows and students with the dominant ways of 
approaching peace and security in Africa in general and peace building and state building 
in particular. It seeks to provide a nuanced way of approaching these issues based on the 
research that the ALC with the support of the Canadian Centre for International 
Development undertook on the topic of ‘reframing narratives of peacebuilding and state-
building in Africa’ focusing on five African countries (Cote d`Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra 
Leone, and Rwanda). The course assumes that Fellows do not have substantive knowledge 
of topics related with the existing terrains of peacebuilding and state-building in Africa and 
hence is designed accordingly. It seeks to acquaint trainees with the peace building and 
state-building landscape of Africa and reframe it in light of the ALC research teams’ 
findings. Hence, it engages the idea of what state-building and peacebuilding mean in Africa 
and problematizes the existing understanding of the two categories of analysis and 
practices. 
Learning outcomes   
At the end of the course ALC fellows will be able to: 
 Engage the theory and practices of state and peace building in Africa; 
 Analyse state and peace building dynamics in countries of Africa; 
 Develop the analytical skill necessary to devise and give guidance on 
programmatic areas of intervention in a country of their academic and practical 
interest; 
 Appreciate the divergent narratives underpinning state and peace building in 
Africa; 
 Evaluate and make judgement on the ‘state’ of state building and peace building 
in Africa in general and their country of interest in particular     
   
 2 
The course is designed to bridge the academic and 
policy world by focusing on thematic areas that have direct and practical relevance to 
policies, and by using approaches suited to that end. Trainees are encouraged to approach 
the praxis of state and peace building in Africa through analytical lenses that will be 
discussed in the process of delivering the course. 
Learning Objects 
 Identifying key currents in the peace building and state building dynamics of 
Africa; 
 Recognize the complex and interacting nature of the drivers of wars in Africa; 
 Single out core issues that shape trajectories of state building in Africa; 
 Understand the distinctive features of post-conflict peacebuilding and state-
building in Africa and their determinants; 
 Analyze strengths and shortcomings of post-conflict peacebuilding and state-
building in Africa; 
Training Methodology 
The course will be delivered using a combination of active lectures, trainee presentations 
and scenario building exercises. The lecture will be delivered in a manner that enables 
trainees to develop the skill of connecting the concepts and theories with their actual 
experiences. They will also have a short presentation on selected topics relating to areas 
they want to have greater acquaintance with. In addition to these, there will be scenario 
drawing exercises on selected themes of state and peace building in Africa. 
Course structure  
Introduction 
Unit One: Peacebuilding and State-building Conversations 
Lesson one: Re-conceptualising Peacebuilding and state-building in Africa 
Lesson two: Notion of Conversation 
Unit two: Theorizing causes of conflict in Africa 
Lesson Three: What African conflicts are about? a deeper look 
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Lesson Four: Who and when is rebellion? 
Unit Three: Theorising post-conflict peacebuilding 
Lesson Five: Stages of conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa 
Lesson Six: Should post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa mean anything other than 
liberal peace? 
Lesson Seven: Inclusionary politics and leadership in Africa 
Lesson Eight: Economic growth and peacebuilding 
Lesson Nine: Features and determinants of post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa  
Lesson Ten: what explain success in addressing root causes? 
Unit Four: State-building 
Lesson Eleven: To what extents the manner African state are formed shaped their 
trajectories?  
Lesson Twelve: Pre-conflict statehood and state-building trajectories in Africa  
Lesson Thirteen: Post-conflict state-building and trajectories of statehood in Africa 
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Reframing Theories of Peacebuilding and State-building 
Course Narrative 
Introduction 
The dominant narrative in extant literature constructs state-building and peacebuilding as 
separate but inter-related endeavours that are opportunistically linked by the incident of 
armed conflict, which offers the possibility to intervene in the process of state-building. In 
its recent incarnation the conventional way approaches the two as parallel, complementary 
and occasionally conflicting agenda. State-building is often understood to be achieved by 
means of violence and war drawing from European experience and peace building is a 
supposedly peaceful endeavour of strengthening structures and processes that tend to 
solidify peace. The possibility of war laying the conditions for peace is not assumed to be 
part of peacebuilding even with the realisation that contemporary peacebuilding manifests 
itself in multidimensional peace keeping operations where peacekeepers intervene to 
make peace and peace builders work in tandem to capitalize on that. Galtung (1996) in his 
book Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization inform us 
that peace has to be achieved or violence of different sorts be attenuated through an 
essentially peaceful means deploying the approaches of non-violent peaceful action. 
However, even he recommends, at times, as a virus is given in the form of vaccination to 
prevent diseases, it might be almost important to use violence to keep the body politic 
peaceful.  
Whatever the case, peacebuilding is construed as acts, policies, and measures that sustain 
and strengthen the structure of peace, which directly leads to the notion of peace. The kind 
of structure to be instituted and the kind of peace they undergird is largely framed in terms 
of liberal democracy and free market system that results in liberal peace. Three central 
issues relating to this major narrative of peace building are essential to point out in light of 
the overall aim of this course. The first issue is the connection between peacebuilding and 
state-building. Second, the possibility of contradictions and trade-offs between the short 
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term goal of stabilisation and the long term goal of 
social transformation. Finally, the underpinning assumptions the liberal notions of peace 
are based.  
The major narrative sees state-building as an essential tool of peacebuilding and hence the 
two are merged together. Liberal ideas of building the state are being considered as part 
and parcel of peacebuilding. The mainstream literature thus dominantly sees peacebuilding 
in terms of crafting and institutionalising architectures of peace. However, it rarely 
presents peacebuilding as a separate agenda from which institutions upholding it (the 
state) evolve except adding certain issues of consideration in the course of ending war, 
which includes themes such as DDR and transitional justice and reconciliation. Therefore, 
the dominant approach to peacebuilding overlooks the deeper issues involved in the 
process of institutionalisation at the core of which is the difficulty to chart a non-violent 
inter-elite and elite society conversation and without which institutionalisation will be 
shallow. It underestimates the fact that ultimately institutionalisation is centrally all about 
the messy political processes involved in inter-elite and inter-society conversation and that 
peace building entails shifting such conversations in non-violent directions.  
Institutionalising liberal democratic states is assumed to lead to a path of sustainable and 
peaceful state without any trade-off between the short term objective of achieving negative 
peace and the long term goal of laying a secure foundation for peace. Relying on a generic 
notion of peace the prevailing approaches do not foresee trade-offs involved in values 
related with efficiency, effectiveness, inclusion, equality, justice, freedom and others. In 
fact, the dominant paradigm is based on the assumptions that structures and institutional 
underpinnings that entrench positive peace are not really in contradiction with efforts 
geared at short term stabilisation. However, there is indeed a contradiction between the 
short term goal of achieving peace and stability and the long term goal of instituting 
structural peace. Positive peace involves dismantling structures of domination, exclusion, 
exploitation, and marginalisation, and to be certain this phenomenon did not hung on the 
air; there are actors benefiting or even internalising the norms generated by these 
structures and hence rarely such changes come about in a peaceful way. This renders the 
standard definition of peacebuilding understood us achieving and sustaining peace by 
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means of liberal statebuilding dubious in its 
intention and ineffective in its action. It is by no means clear whether the goal should be 
achieving short term stabilisation thereby sacrificing the future for the present or 
promoting long term structural transformation thereby risking instability in the present, a 
goal peace building seeks to achieve. This also bring the notion of human agency to the 
foreground as the transformative agenda, if peacebuilding is assumed to refer to the later, 
would not be implemented by local actors if they do not have commitment to such values.  
Hence, the scholarly terrain approaches peacebuilding either in terms of the limited goal of 
building negative peace and hence the institutions of the state would be designed and 
assessed with this goals in mind, or it is perceived in terms of undertaking measures that 
are deeply transformative, which, as noted above, could be in conflict with the short term 
requisite for peace and requires external actor that is able and willing to undertake such 
measures. Peace and state building are value laden concepts our definition of which also 
justifies certain courses of action and de-legitimize others. This generates dilemmas in 
defining the two concepts: if defined narrowly to express the short term goal of 
stabilisation it might preclude actions that would have been deeply transformative, and if 
defined to refer deeper transformation in state and society it begs the question of who will 
bring this in the face of grime reality prevalent in post conflict contexts. The liberal peace 
aims to evade this by assuming that liberal democratic systems are the surest way for short 
term stability and long term transformation. However, the assumptions the framework is 
based, namely acquiring power through elections, and exercising it in a manner that is 
respectful of individual rights, do not exist in many part of Africa and hence its frequent 
failure to bring the ideals it desires to achieve. And this necessitates alternative conception 
of peace and state building in Africa that does not assume consensus on the underpinning 
elements of liberalism.   
The study from which this course was developed sought to redefine peacebuilding 
differently and look at its conflict prevention potentials. As such this course provides a 
fresh way of looking at peacebuilding and its connection with state-building taking the 
trajectories of African states before, during and after a conflict. To this end, it identifies 
certain driving issues that shape the peace and state building dynamics of African countries 
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based on the trajectories of five African states. 
These issues or the lack thereof, as will be revealed, are at the core of these states descent 
into violence and hence post-conflict dynamics need to be assessed based on progress 
along these core issues. Peacebuilding understood this way is firmly anchored in and 
inextricably linked with state-building. This course particularly presents peacebuilding as 
the forging of consensus among elites and through time among the entire society on how 
power should be acquired and with what limit it should be exercised. Given the crisis 
liberal peace is facing and the lack of alternative perceived in some quarter, revisiting the 
peacebuilding and state-building terrain in Africa and exploring alternative way of 
approaching the issue of peace and security in Africa is imperative, and doing so is the 
object this course aims to achieve. 
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Unit One: Lesson one: Re-conceptualizing Peacebuilding and state-building in Africa 
State-building and peacebuilding in Africa, first and foremost, are about creating inter-elite 
and societal consensus on the acceptable means of acquiring power and the limit within 
which it should be exercised. Since having such consensus takes time and requires 
conversations (a notion elaborated in the next lesson), in the initial stage, it would be 
sufficient for this consensus to be limited to the elites level to the extent it includes groups 
that progressively mobilise to be part of the consensus. This is predicated on the 
assumption that in the interaction between the masses and the elites, the elites seem to 
still be in the lead. This means that they have more influence than their followers, and 
hence they have the capacity to diffuse the elite consensus down to the people in their 
everyday life. If checking how power is to be acquired and within what limit it should it be 
exercised cannot be decided from below, then the seemingly best way to go forward, is to 
forge it from above with the assumption that the two levels as neither completely separate 
nor necessarily contradictory. It is also not impossible, though difficult, to build consensus 
on this point at the elites and masses level at the same time. State-building and 
peacebuilding are essentially about developing, expanding and adjusting this consensus 
through time. The more people accept the consensus the more stable a nation could be and 
this consensus is not meant to remain constant. Demand will arise, pressure for change 
will crop up as there is power shift in society up on which a given consensus is based and 
hence necessitating adjustments in the consensuses. There will be those who are losing 
and gaining relative to others and hence power change brings change in gain and loss 
which requires shift in the principles of the consensus.  
Consensus over how power is to be acquired may remain relatively stable for a long time 
as elections have been such an instrument in the Western world for such a long time, 
whereas the limit within which it could be exercised has evolved through time. The 
question to be raised, at this juncture, is whether there is any viable alternative other than 
elections to decide how power should be acquired our answer of which is in the 
affirmative. There can, for example be, collective election where the group represents the 
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person who will be electing their representative. 
The entire village, for example, may agree to let someone on their behalf undertake the 
task of electing prospective administrators from the elites. Even which position requires 
an elected position can be determined through such an agreement. This seems an 
intellectual fantasy, but if one observes the operation of institution in post-conflict 
countries the idea is not entirely inconceivable and totally unintelligible. In many post-
conflict contexts, there are parliaments but they perform little oversight functions; there 
are courts, but very few people get justice from such mechanisms; there is an army and 
police, but they are out there to protect the elites and not necessarily the masses. Given 
these, whether they exist or not do not make a big difference in the life of the masses. 
Crafting institutions of whatever sort thus requires this consensus at least by the majority 
of the elites and this may not necessarily result in liberal democratic institutions. 
Thus we define peacebuilding as conversation between actors that could affect the courses 
of a nation about the terms under which they will be living together and hence the type of 
institutions that would mediate their relations and the relations with those excluded as 
well as the overall philosophy of the kind of political-economic community to be built. 
These conversations may not be explicitly stated but are embedded in the everyday 
interactions of elites. We therefore defined state-building as building institutions of 
governance and inculcating their legitimacy. In this approach the relation between 
peacebuilding and state-building is such that the deeper structures of state-building are to 
be found in the undertakings of peacebuilding in the sense that institutionalisation of 
governance practices follows from, and is hinged up on, the everyday interaction of those 
governed by it.  
There is an argument that the state has been built through violence which is usually made 
in connection with the European experience. There are a number of nuances to be made 
about this scholarly tendency. To begin with, the violence has been externally directed and 
hence might have shifted the balance in the negotiation processes between actors that 
would chart the peace building and state-making processes. Secondly, even if we 
extrapolate that this logic of ‘war making states’ applies to internal conflicts (which our 
position is does not directly lead but could contribute in removing those who would have 
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obstruct the process) this usually does not hold 
with those who are vanquished. The state`s institutions may be strengthened and even 
could avoid major violence by defeating a section of society. But can it reconcile with, and 
gain the legitimacy of, those vanquished both physically and in sprite? That is difficult to 
accept and it is that reason why conflicts re-erupt after being buried in oppressive 
structures for a long period of time. When propitious situation arises that could either 
weaken the structures of control, or increased the depth of grievances for a particular 
group, or widen the number of aggrieved people and/ or a favourable situation for 
rejecting those authorities then violence re-erupt. This is hardly a novel assertion as many 
give explanations for civil war in terms of factors creating grievances, opportunity to rebel, 
and weakening the capacity of the state. Their approach, however, leads to the unintended 
consequence of directing policy measures to those areas rather than to the understanding 
the underlying assumptions and practices generating these factors. Consequently the 
prevailing conceptualisation of peacebuilding and state-building in Africa fails to capture 
the deeper level conversations upon which state-building need to be based. This leads us to 
the procedural dimension of the issue related with the forging of consensus which is the 
focus of the next lesson. 
Lesson two: Notion of Conversation 
Forging consensus requires constant conversations. State-building whatever way defined is 
achieved through conversations of some sort, the nature of which may vary from country to 
country or sub-nationally within country or even with issue areas. The conversation might 
only be between elites or between elite and society. The elite-society conversation might 
also be a dictate of one over the other. Peacebuilding is all about charting a conversation 
(mostly peaceful one) about the constitution of society that is, that the terms its participant 
live together. In this regard, we have to differentiate the concern of elites and the mass; in 
any situation where the interest of one, mainly the elites, outweigh the other in this case 
the masses.  
However, let us point first that the elite-mass dichotomy is extremely crude way of 
approaching the topic as lines of exclusion and inclusion, participation and marginalisation 
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often overlap and are also complex. There would 
be no system that completely relies on the interests of the elites at the expense of the 
masses. There will invariably be willing acquiescence of those who are ruled and again 
mostly they do not keep silent though this does not mean they engage in overt acts of 
violence. The elite will have those from the mass that maintain and render the structures of 
domination as though it is natural. The embedded culture of obedience to authority in 
Ethiopia, the ethnicisation of politics in many part of Africa but notably in Kenya indicates 
this tendency.  
Conversation is essential in forging consensus on how power should be acquired and with 
what limit it should be exercised. Conversation represents a number of interactions and 
processes, and it is not restricted to structured, overt and delineated verbal dialogues, 
discussions or exchanges that occur between varieties of actors within society. Rather, it 
refers to wide-ranging interactions among groups in society – however unstructured, 
unseen, inexplicit and violent the conversations are – and their resulting signifiers. We see 
these as particular forms of conversations, which occur especially in situations where 
power asymmetry is rife not least between populations and those in positions of authority, 
who preside over them. 
These conversations can be said to be about state-building when certain types of issues 
are at the heart of those conversations and when there is an indication that they are 
occurring between particular segments of society. For example, existential issues, where 
the physical or material survival of a group might be at stake; the functioning of state 
institutions and the degree to which they are responsive to the needs of the larger 
population; and access to channels of power and resources, among a variety of other issues. 
As such, when citizens create alternative systems of response to needs deemed to have 
been neglected by their governments or those in authority there is an important 
conversation to be found therein. This is notwithstanding that the absence of a satisfactory 
response system has not been explicitly stated or requested. These conversations might be 
occurring between particular groups and their government; between groups with 
competing demands in terms of access to state resources; and typically, elite groupings 
struggling for the control of machinery of government, among other things. 
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Unit two: Theorising causes of conflict in Africa 
Lesson Three: What African conflicts are about? A deeper look 
Analysing the cause of war is difficult because different people from different strata of 
society engage in a war for different reasons and with different aims. This poses difficulty 
in analysing causes of war and begs question as to the issues and areas to look at when 
analysing causes of war. Should it, for example, be the narratives the organization under 
which people of different motives coalescence? Or should it be an analysis of an objective 
situation a researcher thinks people are aware about, ascribe their situation to the power 
they are fighting against and hence want to bring change in that situation? Research goes 
either way as some look at narratives of grievances related to exclusion, marginalisation, 
and expropriation. Others look at situations connected with poverty, unemployment, lack 
of education, resources base or even topography. Rather than focusing on causes dissected 
in terms of discrete categories it might be worth looking at trajectories, processes, and 
evolutions and identify if there indeed are similar patterns. 
The causes of conflict in Africa cannot be reduced to a single factor. Our research indicates 
that more or less similar sets of factors interact and combined with contingent human 
decision to result in the outbreak of war. However, the mechanism through which these 
factors work and the extent of their relevance may vary from case to case. The most salient 
factors are economic decline, exclusionary politics often manifested in terms of patronage 
politics based on ethnicity and external factors mainly those associated with neighbouring 
countries.  
Economic decline reduces the resource available for patronage and hence a reduction of 
the clients commitment for the patron. Patron-client relationship, as indicated by many 
others, is based on the logic that the patron provides protection and/or financial backings 
in return of which the client is expected to owe allegiance to the patron. However, it should 
be noted that patron-clientism should not be viewed as a fixed category; rather it has to be 
seen as denoting a relationship without assuming that the identity of the actors acting as 
patrons and clients is fixed. Someone who is a client in one relationship could be a patron 
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in relation to another individual who is in lower 
position. Since this kind of relationship needs some selection criteria, the usual way is to 
recruit those assumed to be trustful and hence the resort to ethnic networks and ties. 
Patron-clientism may not by itself result in conflict so long as there is sufficient economic 
resource to have as many clients as possible. The problem, however, is when resources get 
dwindled during periods of economic crises. Under such circumstances, the elites at higher 
level enter into competition to have greater control over resources and hence maintain 
their clientalistic network intact. This fierce competition generates discontent within the 
elite and resort to violence by those who believe that they are denied what they 
legitimately deserve. Economic crisis, at the same time, also means that there will be 
frustration within the population and hence there will be as many disgruntled individuals 
who could easily be cannon fodders in the elite`s war. Economic decline also has an effect 
of weakening the state and its capacity of addressing grievances. All these factors might be 
present and yet a conflict may not erupt and hence what we are providing here is not an 
iron law; it simply is a probabilistic trend in a country sliding into conflict. External factors 
mainly situations in neighbouring countries seems to have important effect in the onset of 
civil wars. A brief narration of how war has emerged in few countries is important in 
illustrating the extent these factors played out in a given context. 
In Cote d`ivoire, Houphouet-Boigny was ruling based on a patronage system. Nevertheless, 
since his regime was registering positive economic growth the country was atypically 
stable in a region plagued by war and instability. However, following his death and in the 
face of declining economy, fierce elite competition sets in that is based on the 
instrumentalisation of ethnicity. This increased the salience of the notion of ivoirie, who is 
genuinely Ivoirian as opposed to migrants, and political exclusion began to be advocated 
along that line. The country began to be plagued by coup and finally rebellion erupted up 
in the Northern part of the country. In Sierra Leone, a different yet substantively very 
similar process was unfolding in the 1990s. The country has been characterised by 
repressive and corrupt politics. The natural resources of which the country is endowed 
have been used to enrich the elites and their clientilistic networks that excluded the youths 
and communities from which the natural resources were being extracted. In 1990, the war 
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in Liberia easily diffused into Sierra Leone when 
the then Charles Taylor supported the Revolutionary United Front to invade Sierra Leone. 
Again, this conflict erupted in a situation of economic crises that was fuelled by the 
structural adjustment programme.  
The Rwandan case is also not different from the others. Since independence there have 
been pervasive practices of constructing and reifying ethnic identity, mainly Hutu and 
Tutsi identity using the media, popular culture, identity card, education and the practice of 
officials. This resulted in the migration of large number of Tutsi who have been 
discriminated against and excluded from political power. With the decline of the economy 
in the late 80s intense power competition ensued among the contending political actors. At 
the same time sections of the Tutsi refugee who were in exile fought in support of Yoweri 
Museveni. These forces organized their power and aggressively fought against the regime 
in Rwanda. In Ethiopia, the centralisation of power by both the imperial regime and the 
Derg that dominantly originated from one ethnic group excluded other elites. Uniquely 
from other African countries the Ethiopian state was forged by the elites of the country and 
hence the builders of modern Ethiopia imposed their culture on peoples who were 
conquered. This generated its own contradictions eventually resulting in the emergence of 
revolutionary insurgents. 
Thus a more or less related set of factors underpin the conflict in Africa though the degree 
of influence of each factors and the mechanism they led to violence vary from cases to 
cases. Most of these conflicts are about the state and over what it can and should do. The 
factors can be categorised into elites level and mass level factors and that the two groups 
engage in violence for different ends. While the elite level factors can be resolved without 
addressing the mass level factors and the reason that push them to violence, it is almost 
impossible to bring negotiated peace unless and otherwise the interests of the elites are 
satisfied. The best that can be done is a partial peace. This explains the almost incomplete 
and mixed outcomes of all settlements. 
Lesson Four: Who and when is rebellion? 
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We still do not have a complete picture of the 
composition of rebel recruits except the leadership of most of these organisations. If 
anything the available research tell us is that rebellion could be initiated by dissident 
students, those within the military, those in exile in neighbouring countries, and those who 
join them could be of various background. For example in cote d`Ivoire the rebellion was 
initially started by those who were members of the army whereas in Ethiopia it was lead 
by Marxist inspired student movements. In Sierra Leone it was the youth who were not 
satisfied with the governance failure that was prevalent in the previous regimes. Delving 
deep into rebel organisations and dissecting how they are organised with what motive and 
governed by what principles is important in order to understand rebellion and their 
consequences.  
Regarding the when question, it is plainly true that rebellion is more prevalent during 
period of transition. One underpinning element of the cases is that outright war occurs 
during periods of transition. The question then is what it is about transition that leads to 
military solution? One hypothesis would be that the process of transition is opened when 
the accumulated problems seems no longer solvable through the normal course of politics. 
The other has it that external factors render some adjustment imperative. A theory 
synthesising these views would have strong explanatory power. Accordingly, the factors 
leading to conflict might first be seen as recognition of the need for transition and secondly 
one`s that room is opened there is no guarantee that the new order would be smoothly 
established. Society might degenerate into violence as competing groups would demand 
more from the arrangement that would be instituted. A further question then is why some 
transition leads to a peaceful outcome while others do not do so and why some transitions 
result in protracted process of violence, negotiation and renegotiation while others do not 
do so? A question not far from this is why some conflicts are protracted than others?  
Transition are moments in which human agency is visibly manifested and as such conflict 
of alternative visions, claims, demands, and resource access are likely to arise during this 
period. Structures and institutions have a sobering effect when they are not shaken. 
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Unit Three: Theorising post conflict peacebuilding 
Lesson Five:  Stages of conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa 
It is important to comment on the appropriateness and normative implications of the pre-
conflict, conflict and post-conflict labels before appropriating the post-conflict 
peacebuilding discourse uncritically. These labelling is based on the assumption that in the 
trajectories of states experiencing violent conflict, it is possible to identify phases where 
there was no armed conflict. This then is followed by a situation of armed confrontation 
and finally culminating in the settlement of the conflict leading to a post-conflict phase. The 
idea that high level armed conflict, as an aberrant feature of society, can be identified in its 
beginning and ending is neither illogical nor unachievable. However, the problem is in the 
assumption that pre-conflict and post-conflict phase are said to be peaceful as opposed to 
the conflict phase. Two observations need to be pointed out in this regard: First, this 
assumption is based on a particular understanding of peace, war and violence and hence it 
is ideologically loaded. Reducing peace to the absence of open and large scale warfare often 
leave out of analysis the immense and innumerable direct and indirect violence the 
consequence of which is comparable to the large scale armed conflict, to say the least. The 
case study countries indicate that there were deep rooted problems in the governance of 
these societies and their overall inter-elite, inter-society and elite-society relations before 
the outbreak of the war was deeply problematic. In Rwanda there was ethnic exclusion 
both in the political and economic sphere before the war; and in Cote d`Ivoire there was 
ethnic favouritism. While in Kenya ethnic favouritism was coupled with land expropriation 
and repression, in Sierra Leone there was societal exclusion mainly the youth and the 
community leading to war. In Ethiopia there was not only exclusion but also outright low 
intensity rebellion in many places before the outbreak of large scale armed conflicts. Thus 
it should be noted that what we call pre-conflict is no less benign than the conflict stage and 
state building should not be construed as returning state and society to their pre-conflict 
stage which most contemporary peace and state building endeavours attempt to do so in 
practice if not in intent. Nor does the post-conflict stage is immune from violence of various 
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sort and hence the pre-conflict-post conflict 
conundrum is better viewed as a spectrum through which the forms and intensity of 
violence vary. 
Lesson Six: should post-conflict peace building in Africa mean anything other than 
liberal peace? 
Examined in light of the causes of African conflict, peace building would essentially be 
about introducing inclusionary politics and achieving broad based economic growth and 
hence this session focuses on the problematique of inclusionary politics in Africa and the 
critique of liberal approach to inclusionary state and peace. Power in general and political 
power in particular is essentially about inclusion and exclusion. This would help us to 
reframe the notion of inclusionary politics in Africa. This issue is very important, at one 
level, because many of the conflicts and the state making and unmaking processes are 
about the terms of inclusion and inclusion. One of the major issues raised in this regard is 
that political parties are not programmatic, that they play divisive politics, and that they 
form networks of patronage that undermine the institutions of the state, weaken the state`s 
institution, erode their legitimacy, and leads to conflict. To the extent that class and ethnic 
division are the primary line of division in society, it would be difficult to expect political 
parties to organize on any other division that would not give them political traction. 
Organising power along ethnic lines may not be inherently flawed to the extent that the 
policy arising thereof are implemented along the state`s formal institutional channel, and 
so long as there is commitment to the rule of law. Moreover, the term of exclusion should 
not violate certain consensually agreed entitlements of excluded groups. Viewed this way 
the problem in Africa is not as much the pervasiveness of exclusion (which is also common 
in developed democracies) as it is the absence of consensus on the acceptable limit of 
power and the standards within which the state`s leadership can act and cannot act. Hence, 
state-building in Africa needs to go beyond establishing institutions or even introducing 
liberal democratic frameworks.  
The liberal democratic regimes of (in)(ex)clusion is based on at least two assumptions: 
First, election would be accepted to be the primary vehicle for determining who should rule 
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and who should not; and second it assumes that 
whoever comes to power certain basic individual rights should not be violated and they 
should be respected for all sections of the society. There are also a range of derivative 
principles such as power has to be divided along the legislative, executive and judiciary 
bodies and that one serves as a countervailing force on the other. However, the experience 
in Africa indicates that elections are not always considered to be the only acceptable way of 
determining who should rule. The experience of post-election violence and controversy 
over electoral fraud indicate that the values of this principle are yet to be internalised by 
many African elites and masses. The elites obviously would not attempt manipulating 
electoral results if their supporters are ready to accept electoral results and oppose any 
attempt of manipulations. This phenomenon is connected with the broader issue of the lack 
of differentiation between, and the fusion of, power and wealth, politics and economics. 
The absence of any economically distinguished class would mean that there would be little 
class division upon which parties would form their programme. This also means that the 
state elite is the only elite that is well organised and endowed with wealth, which mainly is 
due to its association with the state and the use of the states institution to its own 
enrichment and  therefore losing power is perceived to be forfeiting privileges associated 
with holding power.  
The second assumption is not also widely accepted in Africa. To begin with, the notion of 
the ‘individual’ might have different understanding in the Africa socio-cultural milieu than 
the standard Western tradition that view the individual as an autonomous agent and 
society as the sum of the individuals constituting it. Most African cultures, though difficult 
to generalise, are collectivist in their nature as exemplified by the Ubuntu ideal of ‘I am 
because we are’. The gains of an individual are assumed to be the gains of the group one 
belong as African society is ‘a community of sharing’. This culture of sharing give rise to 
what observers of African politics called patron-clientism signifying its less benign effects. 
However, this collectivist morality could also be used to widen the ‘moral community of 
sharing’ to the nation as a whole, and principles of governance driven from that could be 
instituted.  
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The aim here is not to indicate that the liberal 
model of governance is inherently wrong or even cannot be applied to the African context. 
The point rather is to show that the underpinning assumptions of liberal democratic 
governance are not prevalent in many of the countries for which such form of governance 
are promoted. The quick-fix nature of externally driven interventions and the early exit of 
external interveners attenuate the crystallization of such assumptions and hence relapse to 
‘politics of the usual’.   
Lesson Seven: Inclusionary politics and leadership in Africa 
These states can be made inclusionary enough to the extent that there will be no seriously 
disenchanted section of the society that formed a compact group of its own outside the 
state and challenge political order when propitious time arises. In this process, individual 
and/or institutional leadership at various levels is quite crucial to set society on a positive 
course on state and peace building. This, we can reveal, by the lines of contestation and 
norms of legitimation political actors deploy in the course of political competition. The 
tests of leadership are times that are trying, meaning that situations that dwindles the level 
of access to resources which includes economic crisis and electoral periods with all the 
uncertainties they generate. During such occurrences leaders might opt for an easy way of 
manipulating ethnic identities or the hard way of confronting the challenge with all the 
attendant consequences this might entail. To be sure, the likely consequence would not be 
good for them either way: if they opt to follow the former a divisive politics sets in which 
inevitably results in inter-group violence with the possibility of their leadership being 
violently overthrown; if pursued the latter they are to confront a grim reality that they have 
not performed up to the expectation of their constituency and even might be implicated in 
crimes and corruption and hence are likely to be thrown to jail. Thus the extent they set 
society on a positive course on state building and peacebuilding and the attendant strategy 
pursued in that course vary depending on variables such as leadership quality (individual 
and/or institutional), the extent and depth of demand for change, strategies and tactics of 
excluded actors, and legitimising ideology chosen, the sheer number of tasks to be 
undertaken after conflict.     
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Lesson Eight: Economic growth and peacebuilding 
However crucial inclusionary politics might be, it will not be sufficient for peace in poor 
countries of Africa. Economic growth in general and broad based one in particular is 
equally important in the process of building peaceful state and society. Most of the conflicts 
arise during economic crisis partly because crises induced scarcity intensifies inter-elite 
competition, and challenges the prevailing truce among elites. The conflict during such 
crisis, however, may not be simply because of the lack of resources as such; the need to 
adjust principles of distribution and making decision over ‘who gets what and when’ might 
be as important as the competition for the dwindling resources. Whatever the case, state 
and peace building in Africa is also about recording positive economic growth. There often 
is an assertion that growth that is not equitable or broad based exacerbates conflict. 
Houphouet-Boigny of cote d`Ivoire ruled the country until his death peacefully though the 
economic growth registered under his regime, it is claimed, benefited his own ethnic bases. 
Broad based growth is obviously desirable in itself; however, the issue should not be 
approached as an either or option.      
Lesson Nine: Features of post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa  
This session will provide a conceptual sketch of features of post conflict peace building. 
These conceptual sketches are partly based on whether the drivers of the conflict are point 
of post-conflict discussion, and secondly the extent the factors located at different levels is 
addressed. The causes of conflict might be located at the mass level or at the elite level and 
that a given post-conflict peacebuilding may primarily target some factors at one level to 
the detriment of other factors located at another level. Finally, there are factors generated 
by the conflicts that need to be addressed and hence the extent the question of transitional 
justice is addressed and the issue of national reconciliation progressed can add yet another 
conceptual lens to describe features of post-conflict peace building. The lesson also explore 
factors that are responsible for the peacebuilding endeavours to have the shape they 
presently have in regard of which we look at the nature of the war, the way it terminates, 
and the level of involvement of external actors in the peace building process. 
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Assessed based on these classificatory schemes 
one common feature of post-conflict peace building in Africa is that it selectively targeted 
some issues over the others the prioritization of which appears to be regardless of the 
peace implications of the issue. While all the countries studied as part of ALC-IDRC 
research made progresses in addressing issues that have been at the core of their descent 
into conflict, there still are a number of issues demanding consideration and the results 
achieved so far are by no means irreversible. There is also variation in post-conflict peace 
building performance among the five countries and as such the quality of peace observed 
has a distinct feature reflecting the social consensus it is based. In Cote d`Ivoire, post-
conflict peace building was primarily concerned with power sharing and was 
overwhelmingly characterized by a ‘fixation’ on election as if it would heal all the ills the 
state and society was suffering. The process resolved the elite level problem for awhile 
notwithstanding its failure to address the mass level factors related to the economy and 
citizenship. Even the elite level equilibrium break down with the 2010 election when 
Laurent Gbagbo refused to leave power one`s his opponent was declared the winner as a 
result of which the country descended into civil war for the second time until Gbagob`s 
force was defeated and he was arrested. His successor took a number of measures to set 
the country on a positive course by improving the economy (mass level factor), promoting 
national unity (mass level factor), and confronting the issue of citizenship. However, the 
peace building project has been pursued to date without changing the pre-existing 
institutions and hence the process was not accompanied with institutional restructuring. 
In Rwanda the post-conflict peace building agenda was spearheaded by the winning 
Rwandan People Patriotic Front. Due to the nature of the conflict, it faced a huge challenge 
in tackling past abuses for which it used Gacaca courts. Sympathizers and supporters of the 
Hutu power—an ideology that caused the genocide—were excluded from the government 
whereas other political actors were given the opportunity to get representation in the 
transition process. There appears to be good progress in addressing the root causes 
especially those located at the mass level: The economy is broadly inclusive and growing, 
ethnic divisiveness is replaced by national unity, and there was major institutional 
innovation. 
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 In Ethiopia there was major institutional 
innovation and the root causes of the conflict were confronted but not fundamentally 
addressed and thus the limited nature ethno-religious autonomy notwithstanding fairly 
robust economic growth. Ethno-nationalism and discrimination based on ethnicity is still 
rife, repression and human rights violation as rampant as ever, and politics is still 
exclusionary. Hence, while elite level factors remain unaddressed due to the exclusionary 
nature of the regime, factors located at the mass level are partly addressed. In stark 
contrast to the cases mentioned above, in which state-building agenda is driven by 
domestic actors, in Sierra Leone it is lead by external actors. A range of institutions were 
introduced, and election is placed as the only means to acquire power. The management of 
natural resource boosts the economy and benefited the community from which the 
resource is extracted. It seems the Sierra Leone approach seems to face both the mass level 
and elite level factors and show basic progress in many respect though success is by no 
means irreversible. 
Lesson Ten: what explain success in addressing root causes? 
Institutional restructuring—though by no means sufficient institutional restructuring 
seems to have some contribution in explaining change as those countries that venture in 
institutional innovation and undertook restructuring accordingly made better progress in 
addressing the causes of the conflict. All Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone undertook 
institutional innovation and all made significant progress, while in Cote d`Ivoire there has 
been little institutional restructuring and the peace achieved thereof is still fragile. 
External involvement--- the result in this regard is inconclusive. In Cote d`Ivoire, it 
undermined the possibility of even arriving at a settlement. It is only a domestically 
engineered peace agreement that set the context for national election which however was 
followed by violence. In Sierra Leone it clearly helped the peace building process without 
which the state and society would have found it difficult to come up with a workable 
formula under which they live together. Ethiopia and Rwanda achieved their transition 
without significant external actors’ involvement.  
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The nature of the settlement---this seems to 
affect the feature of the post-conflict peace building. A war ended through military victory 
seems to address the mass level factors but fail to avert elite level causes of conflict since 
one side of the contestant is destroyed and its elite sympathizer repressed. Hence, politics 
is likely to be exclusionary of the elites whereas at the same time the state attempts to 
foster closer relation with people at the grassroots level. Internally driven negotiated 
settlements tend to focus on and address elite level factor no matter what the length of 
time the agreement sticks (we have only one case). The progress made by president 
Alassane Quattara after militarily defeating Gbagbo and his inclusion of others as well as a 
good measure of progress is a sign of hope, but it is too early to judge. Externally led 
peacebuilding seems to target both elite level and mass level factors, but its result might be 
easily reversed ones the external actor leave the scene. 
The nature of the war—those with long and protracted war are likely to introduce a 
series of new institutions as the earlier one are tattered by the conflict and their legitimacy 
totally eroded and this it seems helped to somehow start with a new foundations. 
While these could be taken as factors that would potentially affect the outcomes of peace 
building efforts, making generalization requires widening the range of cases so that the 
extent and manner these factors mediate success and failure in addressing the drivers of 
African conflict would be set on firm empirical foundation. 
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Implementation in Rwanda and Côte d'Ivoire". Security Studies. 18 (2): 287-318. 
  
   
 27 
 
Unit Four: State-building 
Lesson Eleven: To what extents the manner African state are formed shaped their 
trajectories?  
The effect of the manner in which African states are formed on their subsequent 
trajectories is much dubious than it is frequently claimed. A fairly tale, which it should be 
noted is right, contends that African states are artificial creation in the sense that their 
international boundaries are imposed upon them by artificially dividing communities of 
similar identities on different side of states` border. However, the process of bordering is a 
dynamic process and thus it is a project than an accomplished occurrence and any border 
no matter how natural it seems always divide people who rather identify themselves to be 
similar. Thus the weight ascribed to the artificiality of African borders may not be as high 
as many claim. The other point that aims to explain the nature and, we can add, the 
trajectories of African states is in terms of their colonial origin and the institutional 
structure inherited from colonialism. This is arguably significantly shaping the trajectories 
of these states for a long time to come. Colonial institutions were designed with the object 
of facilitating exploitation and resource expropriation. During independence these 
institutions were inherited by the indigenous elites without any re-structuring and hence 
the African states remained essentially machines of self-enrichment, resource 
expropriation and exploitation. Our case studies all mention the significance of colonialism 
and colonial inheritance in shaping subsequent trajectories, be it the bequeathing of ethnic 
dominance in Sierra Leone, freezing the Hutu-Tutsi hierarchical divide, or the inheritance 
of France’s power concentrating institutional structures in Cote d`Ivoire. Similarly 
Ethiopia`s state-building trajectories is indicated to be uniquely affected by its peculiar 
past of having a long history and keeping colonialism at bay. Seen in this light the manner 
of formation of African states seems to have significant effect on the subsequent 
trajectories of state building.  
However, such assertions need a few qualifications. To begin with many of these post-
colonial states introduced, albeit briefly, multiparty politics in their early independence 
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history; it is only later that African democracy was 
shattered by coups and communist inspired revolutionary movements. Moreover, the 
global development seems to have more influence than the manner of formation of African 
states in shaping their trajectories of statehood. The 1970s oil crises, the accumulated debt 
burden which was borrowed with cheap interest rate to be paid later with high interest 
rate and their inability to do so, the subsequent economic crises and the structural 
adjustment measures introduced to ameliorate this, and the international sovereignty 
regime have all influenced the state building trajectories of these states higher than their 
colonial origin. The case study countries experienced their civil war during this period of 
economic decline which in the end led to the introduction of some form of institutional 
innovation and a change of governance practice. Nevertheless, the exclusionary nature of 
these states, their elite`s vulnerability to ethnic manipulation, and governance through 
informal networks rather than using the channels of the state`s institution was in existent 
long before the outbreak of violence and it can be said these practice are to some extent 
carry over of colonialism. African states certainly inherited oppressive institutions and 
normative structure they based upon.  
Most important of all, we have to see the effect of colonial inheritance in terms of its 
influence over our theoretical assumption of the need to forge consensus on ‘how power 
should be acquired and with what limit it should be exercised’. In this matter colonialism 
sets little precedent that would help these states start their state building projects on a 
positive course. In some African states, independence was achieved by liberation forces 
that were able to acquire power through blood and iron and the limit of that exercise 
would be determined by the limit over the iron and blood independent fronts command. 
And thus the possibility of consensus over these central issues was foreclosed at the 
outset. This certainly was true for Angola wherein the war of independence was followed 
by two decades of fighting between the major contending parties. In other states where 
electoral politics was introduced, the consensus did not get much traction and hence most 
returned to authoritarianism within a decade. Thus the state-building trajectories of 
African states was distinctively characterised by a lack of consensus on the acceptable 
means of acquiring power and the limit within which it should be exercised. Since, the 
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state`s institution are not based on these 
underpinning consensus political leaders flagrantly violate them, act outside the 
framework set by them, and at time subvert them for their own political ends. In Rwanda 
the state was used to entrench and normalise or even persecute ethnic groups; in Sierra 
Leone these institutions were used to enrich the elites and undertook atrocious crimes; in 
Kenya they have been used to repress dissenters and expropriate the helpless. In Ethiopia 
they were at the disposal of the rulers to entrench extreme form of centralization, 
exclusion and ethnic marginalisation. 
 
Lesson Twelve: Pre-conflict statehood and state building trajectories in Africa  
The pre-conflict African states, as seen in the previous lesson, were therefore deeply 
problematic even before the outbreak of the war. In fact the war is just one episode of the 
countless lower level violent processes the society in these countries had been afflicted 
with. These states were characterised by exclusionary politics usually along ethnic lines 
and power was not always channelled through the state`s institutions, which rather was 
centralised by a coterie of elites who rely on informal networks. Because of these, political 
leaders gradually lost sympathy from both their population and the international 
community and the state become a prize to win for some whereas it is a predator to be 
avoided for others. The management of the economy, by such kind of state, to state the 
obvious was mediated by their exclusionary political praxis and hence the states were 
bound to fracture sooner or later and when it did so it was to be in devastating ways.  
Lesson Thirteen: Post-conflict state building and trajectories of statehood in Africa 
The conflict African states faced added a number of other challenges that shaped the nature 
of the post-conflict state. The manner in which issues arising from the conflict are dealt 
with shapes the nature of the post conflict states in many respects. Almost all states 
undertook measures of transitional justice with varying degree of effectiveness and 
legitimacy. While in some case it is hailed to be necessary though still short of its potential, 
in others it gave rise to notions of victor`s justice thereby setting ground for another round 
of discontent.  
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The post-conflict states display divergent features 
in the manner of their governance and the outcomes of governance practices. While all in 
principle have constitutions that accepts basic rights of citizens, in actuality, some of the 
countries paid lip services to these basic rights; neither the population seems to be ready to 
value this rights for their own sake. Countries that ended the war through military victory 
tend to have strong state institutions, strong in their capacity for mobilisation, resource 
extraction and provision of services. But they tend to be weak in their ability to garner 
legitimacy by accommodating contending elites. There also seems to be a close connection 
between and at time the fusion of party and state in those countries that pursued their 
peacebuilding and state-building agenda after military victory. This is because the winning 
party dominates the government of the post conflict state, and its desire to maintain that 
hegemony by enfeebling political opponents. A related point is that since they came to 
power through military victory of the elites, in such a state the elites feel that they are 
entitled to rule as long as they do it without being encumbered by democratic norms. The 
polarisation of the society and the elites during the war, and the consequent destruction of 
one side also mean that these elites face little resistance in their drive for political 
hegemony.  
Finally, there still are problems on forging consensus regarding how power should be 
acquired and with what limit it should be exercised in many of the African states. 
Informants from Cote d`Ivoire, for instance, indicated to the research team focusing on the 
country that, there is too much focus on elections. They think that though elections are 
important they would not solve fundamental issues of the country. In Sierra Leone, there is 
the view that politics is going along party lines and hence state institutions are being 
sidelined in the process. On the other hand, in Rwanda there seems to be higher trust in the 
government than opposition parties. This, however, does not necessarily mean the 
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Unit Five: Connecting peace and state building: Some concluding reflections 
In section one, we posited the relation between peacebuilding and state-building and we 
problematize the conventional way of approaching the subject. These two concepts are 
presented at times complementary, contradictory and overlapping. This in part is 
connected with pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict division of the trajectories of states 
that faced major war. Peacebuilding defined as an essentially post-conflict phenomenon 
would be different from that defined to include activities at the pre-conflict stages of a 
conflict. In a pre-conflict stage peace building endeavours do not have to grapple with the 
issue of transitional justice and societal reconciliation, elements that are at the core of post-
conflict peacebuilding. We indicated that the definitions of peacebuilding proffered in the 
scholarly terrain are more applicable and are actually drawn based on experience of post-
conflict countries. We have also provided that peacebuilding in Africa is essentially about 
channelling conversations to forge consensus over how power is to be acquired and with 
what limit it should be exercised. Statebuilding entails strengthening the institutions of the 
state and developing their legitimacy. While building consensus on the acquisition and 
exercise of power may not necessarily guarantee peace and stability in and of itself, it will 
result in state institutions that are not flagrantly and unabashedly exclusionary and 
institutions that are able and willing to bring economic improvement for the masses of its 
people. We believe our definition applies for the pre and post conflict spectrum and 
reorient the criteria used to evaluate successes and failures in peace and state building that 
is not based on the extent they resemble liberal democratic societies.   
Understood this way peace building is anchored in, and inextricably connected with, state 
building, the two having a synergetic interactions. While inter-elite, elite-society and inter-
society consensus on the basic issues of the acquisition and manner of exercise of power to 
a significant extent shapes the nature and trajectories of statehood, the states institution in 
turn influence the subsequent dynamics of consensual politics. Thus, building consensus is 
not an end in itself; the aim rather is that institutions and governance practices that are 
based on these consensuses tend to address issues that are at the core of the state building 
trajectories of many of African countries as the lack of consensus is behind the ailments of 
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many of these states. This session concludes 
requesting trainees’ reflections on the challenges and prospects of building consensus over 
how power should be acquired and with what limit it should be exercised. Trainees will 
also be required to brainstorm the kind of state institutions and governance practices that 
will emerge based on these consensuses. A further point of reflection will be the extent 
external actors and factors obstruct the development of such consensuses.   
 
